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Since the 1930s electric utilities have been regulated by the states in which they provide
service. Nominal and real electric prices dropped from 1930 to 1960 as power plants
became larger and more efficient and fuel costs fell. This changed in the 1970s, as fuel
prices, especially oil, soared. The Department of Energy was created in 1977 along with an
independent regulatory authority, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, that
assumed most of the statutory duties of the former Federal Power Commission. The
1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) was passed to deal with these fuel
constraints, and subsequently large utilities began facing competition from small
independent producers and their own large industrial customers.1
Congress formally deregulated the wholesale electric market with the Energy Policy
Act of 1992.2 On April 1, 1998, the largest electric power market in the US, California,
further pushed competition by allowing utility ratepayers to buy from any supplier
they choose. At the time, other states such as Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island were in various states of
restructuring their electricity markets. According to the Department of Energy’s (DOE)
September 2000 deregulation update, twenty-three states had enacted deregulation
legislation, while another twenty had orders pending or ongoing legislative
deregulation investigations. However, while by 2005, eighteen states had deregulated,
they did so by retaining control of the bwiresQ or delivery side of the business, but
removing restrictions on the generation and sale of electricity (Smith, 2005).
Recent research on electric-market competition has generally focused on the effects of
introducing formal markets for wholesale power3 and price spikes and supply problems in
California in 2000–2001 and elsewhere. These studies raise questions about the
effectiveness of these markets. However, there is relatively little evidence on the long-
term trends in the market structure of the US electricity industry following the oil shocks
of the 1970s. If concentration, strategic interaction, and other market characteristics are
affected by technology, firm organization and governance, the legal environment, and
similar factors besides the creation of formal wholesale markets, then a broader
perspective may be necessary to understand the effects of recent policy changes on
market structure and performance.4
We examine market structure in the US electric utility industry from the 1970s to the
1990s. Our results are interesting. First, using a conjectural-variations (CV) approach, we
find that electricity markets became less concentrated beginning in the 1980s, with little1 Their response was to fight the new Carter-inspired competition all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court,
eventually losing in the early 1980s.
2 Throughout the paper we use the term bderegulationQ as shorthand for the introduction of limited market-
based incentives into wholesale or retail markets. Obviously we do not refer to complete deregulation, but rather
the partial deregulation characterizing most restructuring programs.
3 See, e.g., Wolfram, 1999.
4 Danielsen et al. (1999), for example, show how the effects of restructuring depend on courts’ attitude toward
contractual breaches. When restructuring alters the existing bregulatory compactQ, electricity-market participants
increasingly look to renegotiate contractual agreements signed under previous regulatory regimes (to reduce
stranded costs, for instance).
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to estimate a Lerner Index for US electricity markets for part of our sample period, 1981–
1998. The Lerner approach largely confirms the results of the CV approach; namely,
electricity markets became less concentrated during the 1980s (with mixed results during
the 1990s). In short, changes in the industry prior to the 1990s—primarily technological
change, combined with modest deregulation—appear to have had a greater impact than
previously acknowledged. This suggests that the creation of wholesale (and later retail)
markets for electricity should not be characterized as a radical innovation, but rather the
continuation of a secular trend.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the conjectural-
variations framework we use here. Section 3 applies this framework to the US electricity
and presents our estimates. Section 4 presents our structural analysis, describing the
translog production function and providing our estimates of market concentration.2. Conjectural-variations models of industry structure
The conjectural-variations approach is easily illustrated with a standard Cournot model.
Consider a symmetric Cournot game with a homogeneous product where q =industry
output, p( q) is the industry inverse demand curve, and costs are given by c( q). Firm i’s
reaction function is given by differentiating the profit function ki with respect to qi:
dpi
dqi
¼ pþ dp
dq
qi  dc
dqi
¼ 0: ð1Þ
Firm i’s conjectural variation describes its belief about how other firms’ output will change
in response to a change in its output. To incorporate this belief, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as
follows:
dpi
dqi
¼ pþ dp
dq
dq
dqi
qi  dc
dqi
¼ 0: ð2Þ
The difference between (1) and (2) is that qi is multiplied by
dq
dqi
¼ 1þ dqi
dqi
; ð3Þ
where q i denotes the joint output of all firms other than i. Eq. (3) shows that there are
two effects on industry output when firm i increases its output: the direct effect of firm i
increasing output, and an indirect effect when the other firms change their output in
response to firm i. Let vi be firm i’s belief—correct or not—about the other firms’
reactions to its action. Call vi =dq i / dqi the conjectural variation for firm i. That is,
dq
dqi
¼ 1þ vi: ð4Þ
Substituting (4) into (2) yields
dpi
dqi
¼ pþ dp
dq
1þ við Þqi  dc
dqi
¼ 0: ð5Þ
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the conjectural variation term.
(1) vi =0. This represents the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Firm i believes that if it
increases output, its rivals will not respond.
(2) vi =1. This is the perfectly competitive assumption. When vi=1, firm i believes
that an increase in its output will be matched by a decrease in the output of the other
firms. A change in output by one firm will leave industry output unchanged. If all
firms hold this conjecture, then industry output will be at the perfectly competitive
level. Firms believe that an increase in their own output will not affect the price they
receive.
(3) vi =+1. This is the monopoly assumption: firm i believes that its rivals will exactly
match any output changes. In a two-firm game, the industry output will be the
monopoly level. In an n-firm game vi =n1 yields the monopoly output.5
Iwata (1974) proposed a method for estimating the conjectural variation parameter for
an entire industry. It was the first attempt to provide an objective numerical measure of
industry-wide market structure rather than a descriptive measure. He studied the Japanese
flat-glass industry from 1956 to 1965 and presented a statistical test to (1) determine if the
conjectural variation parameter was a specified value, and (2) test the hypothesis that a
certain type of collusion between firms was present. In his model, the profit-maximizing
behavior for all the individual firms in a given industry is
pþ dp
dq
1þ vj
 
qj  mcj ¼ 0; ð6Þ
where j =(1,. . .,n), and mcj =dCj / dqj. If the price elasticity of demand is written as g, then
(6) can be re-written as
pþ 1
g
p
q
1þ vj
 
qj  mcj ¼ 0; ð7Þ
for the entire industry where j =(1,. . .,n). The market share of firm j, qj /q, can be
expressed as
qj
q
¼ g
p
 mcj  p
1þ vj : ð8Þ
The individual firms’ output shares on the left-hand side should sum to one. Eq. (8) can be
re-written as
p ¼ g
X mcj
1þ vj
 
g
X 1
1þ vj þ 1
 
:

ð9Þ5 This class of models has been criticized for failing to explain how firms form their beliefs. Daughety (1985)
responds to this criticism by suggesting that an binfinite regressQ could lead to the beliefs assumed by static game-
theoretic models. Infinite regress describes the situation where Firm 1’s manager tries to think about what Firm 2’s
manager thinks about what Firm 1’s manager is thinking and so on. In such a situation, Daughety shows that each
firm chooses to maximize profits based on output levels, and the Cournot conjecture is appropriate.
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demand (g), the marginal costs of the individual firms (mcj), and the conjectural variation
term (vj).
Rewriting Eq. (7) in terms of vj,
vj ¼ g mcj  p
p
q
qj
 1; ð10Þ
shows that the conjectural variation term is a function of the price elasticity of demand (g),
the individual firm’s marginal cost (mcj), and each firm’s market share ( q /qj).
Market shares can readily be compiled from industry sales data. However, the
individual firm’s marginal cost (mcj) and the price elasticity of demand for the industry
must be estimated. Iwata makes two simplifying assumptions. First, he assumes that the
demand function is log-linear. Consequently, the demand elasticity estimate will be
constant, regardless of the level of demand. Second, the marginal cost (mcj) of each firm is
assumed to be constant with respect to short-run output variations.
Appelbaum (1982) uses a similar approach to estimate the conjectural-variation
parameter for four US industries, rubber, textile, electrical machinery, and tobacco.6
Appelbaum provides a measure of the degree of oligopolistic power of an individual
firm, and creates an index to measure the degree of oligopoly in a particular industry. His
model is based on an oligopolistic industry consisting of s firms. The s firms use n inputs,
x =(x1, . . ., xn) to produce a homogenous output y. The cost function of the jth firm is
Cj =C j( q j,w) where qj is the jth firm’s output, and w is a vector of input prices. The
industry faces market demand schedule
q ¼ J p; zð Þ; ð11Þ
where p is the price of q, and z is a vector of exogenous variables such as the prices or
quantities of other inputs or outputs consumed by the demanders of output q.
Appelbaum invokes Shephard’s lemma to derive input demand functions. He assumes
that all of the firms in the industry are price takers on the input side. Perfectly competitive
input markets are the critical assumption of his model. According to Shephard’s lemma,
x j ¼ BC j q j;w =Bw; j ¼ 1; N ; s: ð12Þ
The jth firm’s profit maximization is
max pq j  C j q j;w  : q ¼ J p; zð Þ ; ð13Þ
and
q ¼
Xs
j¼1
q j ð14Þ6 Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) use this approach for an analysis of the US airline industry.
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p 1 h j  ¼ BC j q j;w =Bq j; ð15Þ
where h j, defined as h j =(Bq /Bq j)( q j /q), is the conjectural elasticity of industry output
with respect to the jth firm’s output and , defined as = (Bp /Bq)( p /q), is the absolute
value of the inverse market demand elasticity. h j is equal to (1+vj), which is one plus each
firm’s conjectural variation. According to (15) the firm equates its perceived marginal
revenue to its marginal cost.
The Cournot, perfectly competitive and monopoly values of h j must be considered.
The ( q j /q) portion of h j is each firm’s output share. In the Cournot case, (Bq /Bq j)=1,
and h j is each firm’s output share. In the perfectly competitive case, (Bq /Bq j)=0, and
therefore h j =0. In the monopoly case, the entire industry will produce the same output as
a single profit-maximizing firm, q =q j, and h j =1. Rewriting (15) and defining
aj ¼ p BC j q j;w
 
=Bqj
 
=p ¼ hj; ð16Þ
as the degree of monopoly power of the jth firm allows us to make some inferences about
the magnitude of aj. We know that marginal costs are nonnegative, ajz0. Since aj is
composed of the inverse elasticity of demand 0, and conjectural elasticity h j, then ajV1.
In the inverse elasticity of demand, 0 will always be less than one, and only in the case of a
pure monopolist will h j =1, resulting in an upper bound of h jV1.
We can aggregate (16) to determine the degree of monopoly power of the entire
industry,
L ¼
X
p mcj
 
=p
 
sj ¼
X
j
ajsj ¼
X
j
h j ð17Þ
where sj= (Bq /Bq
j), and mcj is the marginal cost of the jth firm. This industry measure is
very similar to the approach by Cowling and Waterson (1976). Since h j=(Bq /Bq j)( q j /
q)= (Bq /Bq j)sj, the far right-hand term of (17) can be rewritten as
L ¼
X
j
Bq
Bq j
s2j : ð18Þ
The measure of industry oligopoly power is equal to the sum of squared firm shares
weighted by the firm’s conjectural elasticity, and multiplied by the inverse demand
elasticity.
If firm-specific input and output time series are available for the industry, the full model
can be estimated by the systems (11), (12), and (15). Since firm-specific data are much
more difficult to find, Appelbaum assumes that firms have linear and parallel expansion
paths so that he can use aggregate data instead. In other words, the firms’ cost functions
are in Gorman polar form (Gorman, 1953). With regard to (12), the aggregate demand
function for the ith input is
xi ¼
X
j
x
j
i ¼
X
j
BC j q j;w
 
=Bwi; i ¼ 1; N ; n: ð19Þ
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expansion paths, take the form
C j q j;w
  ¼ q jC wð Þ þ G j wð Þ; j ¼ 1; N ; s: ð20Þ
According to Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1977), if the cost functions are of Gorman
polar form, firms’ marginal costs will be constant and equal across firms. Due to this
assumption, the aggregate input demand functions will be
x ¼ q BC wð Þ=Bw½  þ
X
j
BG j wð Þ=Bw; ð21Þ
and can be expressed in aggregate industry variables rather than firm-specific data.
Given (21), if we assume that h j are the same for all firms in the industry, then (15) will
become p(1h)=C(w) on the aggregate level. This may seem troublesome, because it
assumes that all firms behave similarly. Such worries can be assuaged, if we consider the
maximizing behavior implied by (15). It means that firms equate their perceived
marginal revenues to their marginal cost. If all firms face the same input costs, then in
equilibrium, each firm must have the same conjectural elasticities (h j). It is not required
that the individual firms have the same perceived marginal revenue curves. In
equilibrium each firm will move down its respective curve until its perceived level of
marginal revenues is equal to marginal cost. By this reasoning, we can rewrite the
optimality condition in (15) as
p 1 heð Þ ¼ C wð Þ: ð22Þ
The value of h is equal to the output share in the Cournot case, 0 in the perfectly
competitive case, and 1 in the monopoly case. The model yields an estimate of h that
indicates how far the industry deviates from the perfectly competitive solution in which
h =0. The measure of oligopoly power (17) becomes
L ¼ he: ð23Þ
If the industry is perfectly competitive, the Lerner Index equals zero (L=0), since h =0.
If the industry is monopolistic, the Lerner Index equals the inverse elasticity of demand
(L=0), since h =1.
Eqs. (11), (21), and (22) provide the system of optimality equations for the entire
industry. Since h is not a constant, but rather a function of the exogenous variables, h is
estimated at the equilibrium points as a linear function of the exogenous variables.3. Conjectural-variations estimates for the US electricity industry
3.1. Empirical approach
Using Appelbaum’s framework for aggregate output and input prices and quantities, we
estimate the degree of oligopoly in the US electric utility industry. We assume that the
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inputs, labor xl, capital xk, and fuel xf, whose prices are wl, wk, and wf, respectively.
The electricity demand function is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function
ln q ¼ a gln p=Sð Þ ¼ qln y=Sð Þ; ð24Þ
where S is the implicit GDP price deflator, and y is GDP in current dollars. The demand
elasticity is (g) is assumed to be an absolute value and g =1 /0.
The industry cost function is assumed to be a generalized Leontief cost function
(Diewert, 1971), which is a specific version of the Gorman polar form. Appelbaum (1979)
discusses the advantages of generalized Leontief functions. He chooses this form because
it is flexible, and also provides a second-order approximation of a technology that makes
no assumption regarding returns to scale. The generalized Leontief cost function has the
form
c ¼
X
i
X
j
bij wiwj
 1=2
qþ
X
i
biwi; i; j ¼ K; L;F; ð25Þ
where
bij ¼ bji and
X
biwi ¼
X
j
G j wð Þ: ð26Þ
The equilibrium value of the conjectural elasticity is a function of the exogenous variables
h =h(w), which allows h to vary over time with changes in the economy.
The full model for the electric utility industry is
xK=q ¼ bKK þ bKL wL=wKð Þ1=2 þ bKF wF=wKð Þ1=2 þ bK=q;
xL=q ¼ bLL þ bKL wK=wLð Þ1=2 þ bLF wF=wLð Þ1=2 þ bL=q;
xF=q ¼ bFF þ bKF wK=wFð Þ1=2 þ bLF wL=wFð Þ1=2 þ bF=q;
lnq ¼ aþ lng p=Sð Þ þ q1n y=Sð Þ;
p ¼ bKKwK þ bLLwLL þ bFFwF þ 2bKL wKwLð Þ1=2 þ 2bKF wKwFð Þ1=2
h
þ 2bLF wLwFð Þ1=2
i
= 1 h=g½ ; ð27Þ
where h is linearly approximated as
h ¼ A0 þ AKwK þ ALwL þ AFwF : ð28Þ
Both supply and demand equations appear simultaneously in the system and require a
simultaneous estimation technique. The model (27) is assumed to be stochastic because of
errors in optimization. The additive disturbance term of the ith equation at time t is defined
as ei(t), t =1,. . .,T. The column vector of disturbances at time t is defined as et. The vector
of disturbances is assumed to be joint normally distributed with mean vector zero and
nonsingular covariance matrix X. The model is simultaneously estimated by the full-
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xM, and all others are treated as exogenous.
E e j sð Þe j tð Þ½  ¼ X if t ¼ s
¼ 0 if t p s: ð29Þ
We estimate:
(1) the conjectural elasticity for the industry, h, and
(2) whether h =0, is the perfectly competitive value of h. Since h is not a constant,
and
h ¼ A0 þ AKwK þ ALwL þ AFwF ; ð30Þ
we test the null hypothesis that A0=AL=AF =AK =0.
3.2. Sample, data, and empirical methods
We use data from theMonthly Energy Review, Survey of Current Business, andMoody’s
Public Utility Manual to conduct our analyses. The first three equations in (27) estimate
the cost-share equations of the various inputs. The fourth equation estimates a log-linear
demand schedule. None of the parameter estimates in the fourth equation appear in the
previous three equations, so there is no attempt to identify the supply equation. A log-
linear demand schedule would be appropriate for most industries but perhaps not for
electricity demand estimation. During times of severe weather, the electricity supply
schedule might be extremely inelastic. It is also possible that during times of severe
weather, customers are purchasing large amounts of electricity precisely when the price is
highest. When a demand shock occurs, society must move along the production possibility
frontier and face higher marginal electricity costs.
Economic intuition suggests that electricity should be a normal good and also have a
positive own-price elasticity of demand. The presence of a negative income elasticity
estimate, or a positive own-price elasticity estimate should raise suspicions that there is an
identification problem. FIML estimates of (27) yield price and income elasticity estimates
of 0.82 and 1.13, respectively. The negative income elasticity estimate causes
skepticism of the results. Even more troubling is the fact that the price and income
elasticity estimates are both significant at the 1% level, making it more difficult to reject
the questionable income elasticity estimate.
To account for the possible identification problem, we estimate the following modified
version of (27),
xK=q ¼ bKK þ bKL wL=wKð Þ1=2 þ bKF wF=wKð Þ1=2 þ bK=q;
xL=q ¼ bLL þ bKL wK=wLð Þ1=2 þ bLF wF=wLð Þ1=2 þ bL=q; ð31Þ
xF=q ¼ bFF þ bKF wK=wFð Þ1=2 þ bLF wLwFð Þ1=2 þ bF=q;
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h
þ 2bLF wLwFð Þ1=2
i
= 1 h=g½ ;
which does not include a demand schedule. Kamerschen and Porter (2004) estimate the
total electricity demand by 3SLS. Simultaneous equation approaches such as 3SLS can
account for the identification problem, unlike a log-linear demand schedule. The 3SLS
income elasticity estimates range between about 0.89 and 0.90 depending on the version.
These estimates are far more plausible than the 1.13 log-linear income elasticity
estimate. The 3SLS price elasticity estimates range from about 0.13 and 0.15. We
substitute the 0.13 price elasticity estimate into (29), and do not utilize the log-linear
demand equation. The 0.13 elasticity estimate corresponded to a simultaneous equation
estimate that included both heating degree days and cooling degree days.
3.3. Results
There are 13 free parameters in Eq. (31) to be estimated since the log-linear demand
equation is excluded. The parameter estimates and t-statistics appear in Table 1.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the conjectural elasticity and market con-
centration measure (L=h /g) appear in Table 2. As the conjectural elasticity term (h)
approaches 0, the industry becomes less concentrated.
It is necessary to test whether h =0 to determine whether the underlying market
structure might be perfectly competitive. h is evaluated at its sample mean to test if
A0=AL=AF=AK=0. The results appear in Table 3. The restriction A0=AL=AF=AK=0 is
a sufficient condition for h =0. We evaluate h at its sample mean to test local significance.
The null hypothesis A0=AL=AF =AK =0 is rejected. The one-sided 99% confidence
intervals for hˆ is less than is greater than 0, and less than 1, suggesting that the industry is
neither perfectly competitive or monopolistic.Table 1
Eq. (31) parameter estimates and t-statistics
Variable Parameter estimate t-Statistic
bKK 0.000261*** 7.6093
bLL 0.000489 0.0878
bFF 0.000087*** 6.4211
bKL 0.000040 0.0964
bKF 0.000061*** 4.6543
bFL 0.000442*** 6.8898
bK 217.372300 1.6597
bL 10,056.080000 1.5112
bF 200.653200*** 12.853
A0 0.146872* 2.5354
AK 0.000442*** 6.0772
AL 0.000039 0.3077
AF 0.000301*** 7.0388
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at
the 1% level.
Table 2
Estimated conjectural elasticity (h), 1973–1998
Year Conjectural elasticity
1973 0.13147
1974 0.13201
1975 0.13204
1976 0.13201
1977 0.13209
1978 0.13212
1979 0.13215
1980 0.13237
1981 0.13252
1982 0.13255
1983 0.13246
1984 0.13234
1985 0.13226
1986 0.13214
1987 0.13204
1988 0.13194
1989 0.13180
1990 0.13171
1991 0.13167
1992 0.13167
1993 0.13159
1994 0.13146
1995 0.13132
1996 0.13121
1997 0.13111
1998 0.13085
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power in the British electricity industry. Since British suppliers also faced inelastic
industry demand, most oligopoly models predict prices in excess of marginal costs. While
Wolfram found that prices were greater than marginal costs, full advantage was not taken
of inelastic demand to raise prices as high as the models predict. She concludes (1999, p.
805), that bRegulatory constraints, the threat of entry, and financial contracts between the
suppliers and their customers are considered as possible explanations for the observed
price levelsQ.
If the deregulation movement that began in 1995 actually made electricity markets less
concentrated, then the value of h should decrease after 1995. Inspection of the h estimatesTable 3
Test for of null (h =0)
Restriction: A0=AL=AF =AK =0 107.465
hˆ evaluated at the sample mean hˆ=0.131855 (0.000771)
99% left-side confidence interval for hˆ hˆN0.128966
Monopoly Test
99% right-side confidence interval for hˆ hˆb0.134744
v2 statistic (v2(4),0.01=13.3).
D.R. Kamerschen et al. / Energy Economics 27 (2005) 731–751742shows that hˆ fell from 0.131324 in 1995 to 0.130852 in 1998, consistent with increased
competition. We separated the data into to sets, pre-1996 data and 1996–1998 data.
We evaluated hˆat the sample means. The pre-1996 hˆ value was 0.131993, while the 1996–
1998 hˆ value was 0.131058.
Estimates of the conjectural elasticity term indicate that the electric utility industry is
neither perfectly competitive nor monopolistic. The industry does not charge monopoly
prices based on own-price elasticity estimates. This is probably due to the regulatory
scrutiny and the potential entrants that the industry faces. More important is the long-term
trend: the conjectural elasticity estimates peaked in 1982 and fell steadily thereafter,
suggesting a decrease in market concentration. The conjectural elasticity estimate has
continued to decline since 1995, when formal deregulation of wholesale markets began to
be implemented. This suggests that the effects of these recent policies may be more modest
than previously acknowledged.4. A structural approach
The CV approach is based on a reduced-form model. To check the robustness of our
results, we tried to replicate them using a structural model. The structural model uses a
translog cost function to estimate the Lerner Index (LI), a standard measure of industry
concentration. The LI is defined simply as the difference between industry price and
industry marginal cost, all divided by industry price. A perfectly competitive industry has
a LI of zero, while a purely monopolistic industry has a LI of 1.
We estimate the LI for the US electricity industry. We estimate the marginal cost of
producing aggregate electricity for the three primary consumer classes (residential,
commercial, and industrial) and compare the marginal-cost estimate to the observed
composite electricity markets. The marginal-cost estimates and observed prices are used to
construct the Lerner Index for the electric utility industry to shed light on the trend of
monopoly power in the electricity market.
4.1. Translog models of electricity production
We begin with the translog production function proposed by Christensen et al. (1973).
This is a flexible form that allows for increasing or decreasing returns to scale and makes
no assumption regarding homogeneity or input substitutability. The translog belongs to a
class of functions that Blackorby et al. (1977) refer to as general quadratic flexible forms.
A three-input version of the translog production function (Beattie and Taylor, 1985, p. 66)
takes the form
Q ¼ b0xa11 eb1x1xa22 eb2x2xa33 eb3x3 ; ð32Þ
where Q represents output, x1, x2, and x3 represent the three inputs, and the a’s and b’s are
parameters. According to Beattie and Taylor (1985, p. 249) the derivation of the indirect
cost function from the translog production function is mathematically intractable. The
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expansion,
lnQ ¼ b0 þ bi
X
i
lnxi þ 1
2
bij
X
i
X
j
lnxilnxj: ð33Þ
A time component is usually introduced into (33) to account for technological change.
Since the production function is a second-order approximation, both t and t2 are added to
the equation (Coelli et al., 1998, p. 36). The addition of the technological change
component allows (33) to be re-written as
lnQ ¼ b0 þ bi
X
i
lnxi þ 1
2
bij
X
i
X
j
lnxilnxj þ btt þ bttt2: ð34Þ
The annual percentage change in output resulting from technological change is estimated
by taking the partial derivative of (34) with respect to time:
BlnQ
Bt
¼ bt þ 2tbtt: ð35Þ
The technological change format of (34) and (35) assumes Hicks-neutral technological
change, which assumes that the shape of the isoquant does not does not change over time,
and the marginal products of each input do not change. The Hicks-neutral cost function
corresponding to (34) is
lnc4 ¼ b0 þ bQlnQþ
X
i
bilnwi þ
X
i
bQilnQlnwi þ 1
2
X
i
X
j
bijlnwilnwj
þ 1
2
bQQ lnQð Þ2 þ btt þ bttt2 þ v: ð36Þ
Eq. (36) can be modified to account for non-neutral technological change by adding
regressors that capture the cross effects of the inputs with time, and output with time,
bktlnwkt +bltlnwlt+bftlnwft+bQtlnQt. The modified version of (36) appears as
lnc4 ¼ b0 þ bQlnQþ
X
i
bilnwi þ
X
i
bQilnQlnwi þ 1
2
X
i
X
j
bijlnwilnwj
þ 1
2
bQQ lnQð Þ2 þ
X
i
bitlnwit þ bQtlnQt þ v: ð37Þ
The large number of parameter estimates can lead to degrees-of-freedom or
multicollinearity problems that will cause the estimates to be inefficient. Christensen
and Greene (1976), following Zellner (1962), use Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR) to obtain more efficient estimates. The cost function is estimated simultaneously
with the input demand equations which are derived by using Shepherd’s lemma. Cost-
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shares are
sk ¼ wkxk=cð Þ ¼ bkbkk lnwk þ bkllnwl þ bkf lnwf þ bkqlnQþ vk ; ð38Þ
sl ¼ wlxl=cð Þ ¼ bl þ blllnwl þ blk lnwk þ blf lnwf þ blqlnQþ vl; ð39Þ
sf ¼ wf xf =c
  ¼ bf þ bf f lnwf þ bf k lnwk þ bf llnwl þ bf qlnQþ vf : ð40Þ
One of the share equations must be dropped for the SUR estimation procedure to yield
efficient maximum likelihood estimates. The results are the same regardless of which
share equation is dropped.
The efficiency of parameter estimates is increased by placing restrictions on the cost
function. Possible restrictions include homogeneity of degree one in prices, homotheticity,
and homogeneity. If the cost function is derived from the neoclassical model, then the cost
function should be homogeneous of degree one in prices. Homotheticity is imposed by the
restriction bQi =0 (Eq. (37)). Likewise if bQQ =0, then homogeneity is also imposed. The
SUR approach combined with the restricting of the cost function can mitigate the degrees-
of-freedom problem.
Once the degrees-of-freedom problem is dealt with, the problem of how to allocate costs
properly among the different customer classes arises. Electricity price and quantity data are
disaggregated among the three primary customer classes, commercial, industrial and
residential. If a given customer class purchases more electricity during peak hours, then it is
inappropriate to assume that marginal generation costs are the same for all customers.
There is considerable evidence that instead of allocating marginal costs among
customer classes by the percentage of electricity output that each class purchases, a
multiple-output production model would be more appropriate. This approach was
suggested by Joskow and Schmalensee (1983).
Hayashi et al. (1985) estimate marginal costs in a multi-output approach to study quasi-
optimal pricing rules under rate-of-return regulation. They find that prices were not quasi-
optimal, and that alternative pricing arrangements could be welfare-enhancing.
Karlson (1986) tests the separability of inputs and outputs and determines that the
multi-output approach was appropriate. Karlson estimates a translog production possibility
frontier (PPF) among the three types of electricity output. He derives the marginal rates of
transformation among outputs, and the marginal products of each input from the PPF. Each
marginal rate of transformation equation and marginal product equation contain a
separability term, umj between each output and each input. If the joint null hypothesis of
separability,
H0 : /mj ¼ 0; for all m; and all j; ð41Þ
is rejected, then the multiple-output approach would be appropriate. Although Karlson
find that none of the individual separability terms were significantly different from zero,
he find that the joint null could be rejected well above the 99% significance level. This
suggests that electricity should be modeled as a multiple-output activity, and that the
electricity output should be distinguished by its customer class.
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function in (37), since total costs should be estimated by the multi-output translog cost
rather than the single-output version of (43). The multi-output translog cost function used
by Burgess (1974) and Caves et al. (1980) is
lnc* ¼ a0 þ
X
i
ailnQi þ
X
i
bilnwi þ
1
2
X
i
X
j
aijlnQilnQj
þ 1
2
X
i
X
j
bijlnwilnwj þ
X
i
X
j
qijlnwj: ð42Þ
The cost-share equation for each input is
si ¼ bi þ
X
j
bijlnwj þ
X
j
qijlnQj þ vi: ð43Þ
The derivation of the marginal costs by product class is not as apparent since the
derivative (BlnC) / (BlnQi) is in the form of an elasticity (where mci= the marginal cost of
the ith output).
BlnC
BlnQi
¼ mci Qi
c
¼ ai þ
X
j
aijlnQj þ
X
j
qijlnwj: ð44Þ
To obtain the marginal cost of the ith output, (BlnC) / (BlnQi) needs to be multiplied by
(c) / (Qi). The marginal cost of the ith output is
mci ¼ ai þ
X
j
aijlnQj þ
X
j
qijlnwj
 !
c
Qi
: ð45Þ
The marginal cost estimates in (45) are used to construct Lerner Index for each of the
customer markets.
4.2. Estimation procedure
We use a version of (45) to estimate the Lerner Index for the residential,
commercial and industrial electricity markets. The technology is assumed to be Hicks-
neutral. A three-input, three-output estimation of (45) requires the estimation of 30
parameters (including time and time-squared), which leaves few degrees of freedom.
To mitigate this potential problem, we impose homotheticity and homogeneity
restrictions on the model. The homotheticity assumption restricts the output-input
interaction terms qij =0, and eliminates 9 of the 30 parameters. The homogeneity
assumption restricts the interaction term between the various outputs aii =0, and
eliminates an additional three parameters (since there are three electricity outputs). The
combined homotheticity and homogeneity restrictions reduce the number of parameter
estimates from 30 to 18.
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outputs commercial (QC), residential (QR), and industrial electricity (QI) is
lnc4 ¼ a0 þ aClnQC þ aRlnQR þ aIlnQI þ bK lnwK þ bLlnwL þ bF lnwF
þ aCRlnQClnQR þ aCIlnQClnQI þ aRIlnQRlnQI
þ 1
2
bKK lnwKð Þ2 þ bLL lnwLð Þ2 þ bFF lnwFð Þ2
h i
þ bKLlnwK lnwL
þ bKF lnwK lnwF þ bLF lnwLlnwF þ bt t þ btt t2: ð46Þ
Eq. (46) is estimated by SUR. The inclusion of input cost-share equations in the system
reduces the degrees of freedom problem. The input cost-share equations are identical to
(43) except that the qij =0, due to the homotheticity restriction. The restricted cost-share
equations are
si ¼ bi þ
X
j
bijlnwj þ vi: ð47Þ
Once the parameter estimates are determined, they can be used to estimate the marginal
costs of producing electricity. The marginal cost estimates are identical to (45) except that
once again the qij term is dropped. The modified version of (45) that does not include the
qij term is
mci ¼ aI þ
X
j
aijlnQj
 !
c
Qi
: ð48Þ
Once the marginal cost has been estimated, we can calculate the Lerner Index. Since
customer class data is collinear, we estimate only aggregate electricity marginal price
rather than separate estimates by customer class.
4.3. Results
Translog estimates of aggregate electricity were completed. A single-output version of
(46) has the form
lnc4 ¼ a0 þ aQlnQþ bK lnwK þ bLlnwL þ bF lnwF
þ 1
2
bKK lnwKð Þ2 þ bLL lnwLð Þ2 þ bFF lnwFð Þ2
h i
þ bKLlnwK lnwL
þ bKF lnwK lnwF þ bLF lnwLlnwF þ bQtlnQt þ bt t þ btt t2: ð49Þ
The total electricity marginal cost estimate can be compared to actual prices. Estimated
marginal costs can be compared to the observed total electricity price to investigate
whether the industry has become less concentrated. The SUR estimates for Eq. (46) appear
in Table 4. We use the same data set described earlier.
The aggregate electricity price, estimated marginal production cost, and price-cost
margin or Lerner Index are evaluated for the 1980s and 1990s period in Table 5. The
Table 4
Translog total electricity parameter estimates
Variable Parameter estimate t-Statistic
A0 2.775998 0.948021
aQ 0.433765** 2.030211
bK 0.333823** 2.179726
bL 6.607682*** 11.76475
bF 0.064516 1.031417
bKK 0.098037** 2.471167
bLL 2.396696*** 8.455533
bFF 0.026673*** 3.866116
bKL 0.045613 1.359360
bKF 0.015025 1.274965
bFL 0.009633 0.900644
bQt 0.000178 0.220245
bt 0.036332* 1.987557
btt 0.002056*** 2.737459
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at
the 1% level.
D.R. Kamerschen et al. / Energy Economics 27 (2005) 731–751 747estimated price-cost margins (or Lerner Index) fell from about 0.22 in 1981 to 0.05 in
1998. The downward trend suggests that the industry was becoming less concentrated
during that period. The Lerner Index in electric industry fluctuated moderately from 1988
to 1994, increased from 1995 to 1997, then decreased in 1998. Any effectiveness of the
electricity restructuring legislation was not seen until 1998, when the Lerner Index fell,
although it was still higher than several years from 1987 to 1997.Table 5
Aggregate electricity price, estimated marginal production cost, and Lerner Index, 1981–1998
Year Total electricity pricea Estimated marginal production costa Lerner Index or price-cost margin
1981 5.5 4.307 0.21676
1982 6.1 4.981 0.18336
1983 6.3 5.332 0.15353
1984 6.25 5.453 0.12747
1985 6.44 5.858 0.09032
1986 6.44 6.140 0.04655
1987 6.37 6.260 0.01714
1988 6.35 5.968 0.06003
1989 6.45 6.218 0.03587
1990 6.57 6.290 0.04258
1991 6.75 6.474 0.04088
1992 6.82 6.584 0.03450
1993 6.93 6.561 0.05323
1994 6.91 6.662 0.03581
1995 6.89 6.513 0.05467
1996 6.86 6.397 0.06749
1997 6.85 6.244 0.08842
1998 6.74 6.398 0.05072
a Cents per kilowatt hour.
Table 6
Lerner estimates for selected industries
Author (Year) Industry Lerner Index
Bresnahan (1982) Automobiles 0.100–0.340
Appelbaum (1982) Rubber 0.049
Textile 0.072
Electrical Machinery 0.198
Tobacco 0.648
Porter (1983) Railroads (in collusive phase) 0.40
Lopez (1984) Food Processing 0.504
Roberts (1984) Coffee Roasting (largest/second largest firms) 0.055/0.025
Spiller and Favro (1984) Banks (Regulated, large firms/small firms) 0.88/0.21
Banks (Deregulated, large firms/small firms) 0.40/0.16
Suslow (1986) Aluminum 0.590
Slade (1995) Retail Gasoline 0.100
Karp and Perloff (1989a) Rice Exports (largest estimate) 0.11
Karp and Perloff (1989b) Small Black and White TVs in Japan 0.58
Buschena and Perloff (1991) Philippines Coconut Oil 0.89
Wann and Sexton (1992) Fruit Cocktail 1.41
Gasmi et al. (1992) Soft Drinks (Coke/Pepsi post 1976) 0.64/0.56
Ellison (1994) Railroads (in collusive phase) 0.472
Deodhar and Sheldon (1995) German Bananas 0.26
Taylor and Zona (1997) AT&T (long-distance telephony) 0.88
Genesove and Mullin (1998) Sugar Refining 1880–1914 0.05
Hyde and Perloff (1998) Australian Retail Meats c0
Sources: The above studies are cited in part or whole in Bresnahan (1989, Table 17.1, p. 1051), Carlton and
Perloff (2005, Table 8.7, p. 277), and in Church and Ware (2000, Table 12.4, p. 447).
D.R. Kamerschen et al. / Energy Economics 27 (2005) 731–751748To see how these estimates of the Lerner Index for the US electric industry compare to
other industries, Table 6 summarizes recent evidence on Lerner indices in various
industries, some of which exhibit considerable monopoly power. The table shows the
authors, date of publication, and estimated Lerner Index.7 In general, the Lerner Index for
the US electricity industry is considerably lower than that of most of the industries shown
in Table 6.5. Summary and conclusion
A nationwide movement to deregulate (more precisely, restructure) electric utilities
emerged in the 1990s. The process gained momentum on December 20, 1995, when the
California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) issued an opinion that California electricity
consumers should be able to choose their provider by 2003. On September 23, 1996,
California Governor Pete Wilson signed Assembly Bill 1890 into law, mandating a 10%
rate cut for most electricity customers, and allowing most customers to choose their7 Wolfram (1999, Table 1, p. 813) shows numerous values for price-cost markups for the British electricity
industry. The British electricity prices are generally more than 20% above marginal costs, but are well below these
predicted in traditional oligopoly models for an industry facing an inelastic demand. Of course, the UK is not like
the US in that the UK rivals compete in a unified, national market.
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deregulate electric utilities has been proposed or adopted in every state in the country.
However, there is concern that CaliforniaTs subsequent energy crisis may be in part the
result of rushing the deregulating of the retail electric markets (see, e.g., Smith, 2000). If
California is a bellwether for what other states may face in their deregulated markets, the
deregulation movement may be arrested or slowed considerably. According to Joskow
(2001), the problem in California was not inherent with deregulation, but rather with the
way California implemented its reforms combined with ba good deal of bad luck and
ineffective government responses.Q Making competition more intense has proved to more
difficult that states anticipated, largely because erratic wholesale prices have increased retail
rates and a credit crunch has decreased the pool of competitors (see, e.g., Smith, 2005).
While not directly addressing broader issues related to competition per se, we find
compelling evidence that the electric industry was becoming less concentrated during the
1980s, before the reforms discussed above were implemented. In the 1990s, the picture is
less clear. Our estimated Lerner Index fell steadily from 1981 to 1987, fluctuated
moderately from 1988 to 1994, increased from 1995 to 1997, and fell again in 1998.
According to the conjectural variation approach, the electricity industry has become
gradually and consistently less concentrated from 1982 to 1998. Indeed, the CV parameter
is steadily declining long before deregulation, and the rate of decline following 1995 is
about the same as that before 1995. Perhaps it is too early to tell what deregulation has
accomplished or will accomplish in the future, but it is clear that electricity markets were
opening up even before the formal deregulation of the late 1990s.
Thus, our results are consistent with the view that deregulation has (so far) not had a
measurable effect on economic performance. This leaves us with a mystery. Why was the
industry gradually becoming less concentrated without major changes in the regulatory
framework? Was it technological or organizational change, or changes in de facto
regulation that are difficult to discern? This problem has not really been addressed in the
prior literature. In a sense, our results weaken the case for formal deregulation, or at least
suggest that competition was gradually being introduced anyway, even without deliberate
action by regulators. Of course, we ignore important controversies over the bmeaning of
competitionQ (Hayek, 1948), such as actual versus potential competition, static equilibrium
versus dynamic process notions of competition, and the like (Machovec, 1995). Still, our
findings suggest that the story of electricity restructuring in the 1990s is more subtle and
complex than is often recognized.
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